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Article 4

CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS
Frank M. Covey, Jr.*
State control of both public and private access is fast becoming a maxim of modern highway programming. Such control is
not only an important feature of the Interstate Highway Program,
but of other state highway construction programs as well. Under
such programs, authorized by statute, it is no longer possible for
the adjacent landowner to maintain highway access from any part
of his property; no longer does every cross-road join the highway.
This concept of control and limitation of access involves many
legal problems of importance to the attorney. In the following
article, the author does much to explain the origin and nature
of access control, laying important stress upon the legal methods
and problems involved.
The Editors.
I. INTRODUCTION-THE NEED FOR ACCESS CONTROL
On September 13, 1899, in New York City, the country's first
motor vehicle fatality was recorded. On December 22, 1951, fiftytwo years and three months later, the millionth motor vehicle
traffic death occurred.' In 1955 alone, 38,300 persons were killed
(318 in Nebraska); 1,350,000 were injured; and the economic loss
ran to over $4,500,000,000.2 If the present death rate of 6.4 deaths
per 100,000,000 miles of traffic continues, the two millionth traffic
victim will die before 1976, twenty years after the one millionth.
Many of these deaths can be prevented only through law enforcement, motor vehicle administration, and driver education.
But many others can be prevented through the design and engineering of our highways. Of all the design features, control of
*

B.S., Honors, 1954; J.D., cum laude, 1957, Loyola University (Chicago);
Automotive Safety Foundation Fellow in Graduate Law, University of
Wisconsin, 1957-58; Member of Chicago, Illinois State, and American
Bar Associations. Presently a Teaching Associate in Law, Northwestern University.
Shearer, "Built-in Safety," Automotive Industries, Dec. 1, 1956, p. 71.

2 "Accident Facts," National Safety Council (1956), p. 43. The total
automotive deaths through mid-year 1956, 1,168,075, exceeded by a
wide margin the 1,009,750 American military deaths in all the wars
in our history from the first battle of the Revolution to the Korean
conflict.
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access contributes most to highway safety.

It eliminates the dan-

ger of traffic entering the roadways, the danger of turns, and the
danger of intersecting streams of traffic.
Although roads in the United States having a high degree of
controlled access date back only to 1923, they have been in existence a sufficient length of time to allow the compilation of valid

comparative records concerning accidents and fatalities on con-

trolled and non-controlled access roads. 3 It has been estimated
that the fatal accident rate on highways with full control of access is one-fourth to one-half of the accident rate on comparable

roads without access control.4 Known comparisons support this
estimate

and illustrate that control of access is a very necessary

tool in reducing the staggering toll of death, injury, and property
damage on our highways.
In addition to safety, limited access roads present the driver
with a more economical and efficient means of transportation.
The national highway system of over 3,300,000 miles of roads rep3 Information obtained from the Bureau of Public Roads gives an interesting comparison of the accident and fatality rates on controlled
access versus non-controlled access facilities in major cities. There
are 154 accidents with a fatality rate of 2.3 persons per 100 million
vehicle miles driven on urban freeways as compared to 751 accidents
and a fatality rate of 4.2 persons per 100 million vehicle miles driven
on non-controlled city streets. See: "What Freeways Mean to Your
City," Automotive Safety Foundation (1956).
4 Owen, "The Metropolitan Transportation Problem," The Brookings
Institution (1956), pp. 43-45.
G The following indicate the safety record of comparable limited access
roads and land service roads:
a. U.S. Route 1 in Maine, 22.3 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles;
Maine Turnpike (controlled access-comparable), 2.8 deaths per
100 million vehicle miles. See: Gibbons and Proctor, "Economic
Cost of Traffic Congestion," Highway Research Board Bulletin 86
(1954), pp. 1, 27.
b. U.S. Route 1 in New Jersey, 103 deaths during years 1940 to 1944;
Merritt Parkway (controlled access-comparable), 23 deaths during the same period. This reduction in the number of deaths
compares favorably with the seventy-five percent reduction in
accidents achieved in California after placing of limited access
on the Arroyo Seco. See: Cunnyngham, "The Limited Access
Highway From the Lawyer's Viewpoint," 13 Mo. L. Rev. 19,24
(1948). Hereinafter cited as Cunnyngham.
c. U.S. Route 112 in Michigan, 15.0 deaths per 100 million vehicle
miles; Detroit Industrial Expressway (controlled access-comparable), 6.7 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles. See: Williams and
Fritts, 'et's Build Safety Into Our Highways," Public Safety,
May, 1955 (reprint, p. 3).
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resents the largest and best highway system in the world, yet it
does not measure up to the requirements of modern highway
transportation. A study in the Los Angeles area indicated that
travel between two points which required ten minutes by horse and
buggy in 1914 took fourteen minutes by car in 1942.6 Access controls have helped to remedy this situation in all sections of the
country. In Detroit, the one and one-half mile trip on the Davidson Limited Highway reduced the time formerly required to cover
the same distance from twenty or thirty minutes to three or four
minutes. Limited access on the Arroyo Seco has cut twenty-five
minutes off the driving time between Los Angeles and Pasadena,
California."
Studies of cost of operation on limited access roads indicate
that they are much more economical for driving. In the Detroit
area, it is estimated that operating costs on an expressway are
5.18 cents per mile as opposed to 8.90 cents per mile on city streets.
In Los Angeles a similar study indicates 4.02 cents per mile for
expressways and 8.12 cents per mile for surface streets.9 An extremely thorough study of comparative driving conditions concludes:
The data of this study indicates that fully and partially controlled-access highways carrying substantial volumes of throughtraffic result in: (1) a significant saving in time and a significant
reduction in gasoline consumption in urban areas; (2) a significant
saving in time, but no significant reduction in gasoline consumption in suburban areas; (3) no significant savings in time nor reduction in gasoline consumption in rural areas; and (4) a significant
decrease in the accident rate in urban, suburban, and rural areas.' 0
A limited access road is a more economical and efficient roadway
for the driver.
6 Sert, Can Our Cities Survive? (1942).
7 This is clearly illustrated in a summary of twelve case studies. Where
access was fully controlled, the average speed in both rural and urban
areas was 47 miles per hour as compared with 39 miles per hour in
suburban areas and 26 miles per hour in urban areas where no access
control existed. May, "Economics of Operation on Limited Access
Highways," Highway Research Bulletin 107 (1955), pp. 49-55. Hereinafter cited as May.
8 See Cunnyngham, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 19, 23. It is estimated that
the Willowrun Expressway in the Detroit area saves five million man
hours per year.
9 "Automotive Facts and Figures," Automobile Manufacturers Association (1956), p. 48.
10 See May, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 49, 61.
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The controlled access road offers another significant advantage: it protects the state's investment in its road system. Our
roads represent a tremendous investment in land, materials and
money. Nebraska alone spent $32,745,000 for its roads in 1955,
exclusive of federal aid.-' It is imperative to insure (1) that the
state gets the maximum possible safe use from the roads it builds,
and (2) that the maximum possible safe use is protected for as
long as possible.
The maximum possible safe use of a roadway is best achieved
through limitation of access. A six-lane controlled access road
can carry 50,000 cars per day, but it would require 18 lanes for a
non-limited access road to carry a like number. Fifteen hundred
vehicles per hour can better be accommodated on a single controled access lane than the 400 vehicles that a single non-controlled
access lane can carry per hour. 1 2 Access control is an important
device for insuring maximum use of our highways.
Furthermore, unless access control devices are used, a road
may become functionally obsolete long before it is worn out.
Without access control the "highway cycle" of overcrowding the
roadside, growth of traffic-service facilities, and crippling of the
road's traffic carrying capacity, will result in the reduction of the
usefulness of many structurally serviceable roads. 13 The state
can ill afford the luxury of successively more frequent and more
expensive highway relocations or by-passes. But with access controls we can "keep our highways young" and prevent such highway strangulation.
It would seem logical and justifiable to use similar measures
to protect the public investment in the ordinary highways so important to the economy of the state. With the knowledge and
skills now available to highway planners, it should be possible
to lay out roads of reasonably permanent location with design
to insure that the roads will be serviceable
standards adequate
14
indefinitely.

11 "Highway Statistics," Department of Commerce (1957), pp. 52, 56. Of
this $25,630,000 was spent for construction and $7,685,000 was spent
for maintenance. With the advent of recent Interstate Highway construction in Nebraska, this amount has substantially increased.
12 Cunnyngham, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 19, 23. These statistics indicate
that a limited access road can carry up to three times the amount of
traffic with no increase or widening of existing traffic lanes.
13 Levin, "Public Control of Highway Access and Roadside Development"
(1947), p. 5 et seq.
14 Ahner, "Planned Access-Control Keeps Our Highways Young," Traffic
Quarterly, October, 1957, p. 459.
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Control of access is the key to building safer, more pleasant, more
efficient, and longer-lasting roads.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
While a leading access rights case states that ". . . [the right
of access] may be said generally to have arisen by court decision
declaring that such right existed and recognizing it,"' 0 the right
developed by much more subtle means. In 1857, the leading
American text on highway law made no reference to any rights
that an abutter might possess in a highway,' 6 but such a concept
had appeared in a 1741 Abridgement.
He that has ingress into a house, ought to have it at the usual
door; and if they leave such door open, but1 dig a ditch that he
[Emphasis in the
cannot enter without leaped, it is a breach.
original.]
This would seem to be the first legal recognition of the existence
of a right of access from an abutter's land to an adjoining roadway.
In 1813 in a case that turned on whether a street was a public
or private street, the Court of Common Pleas stated that if it
were public, the plaintiff would have a right of access.' s "A
public road differs from a private road in this: you may make
an opening in your fence and go into it at any part of the length
of the public road.. ."19 In 1860 in a similar case the court stated:
"If it be a highway up to the boundary of the plaintiff's land, then
as a matter of law, the plaintiff has a right of access to it from any
part of his land." 20 [Emphasis supplied].
While it was early recognized by the courts that access to
the street system was a necessary adjunct to an urban lot,21 the
first American case dealing with interference with the right of
15 Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
For this reason, in determining the right of access, most cases rely,
without discussion, upon precedents which are analogous to the circumstances in the case before the court.
16 Angell and Durfee, Law of Highways (1857).
17

Viner's Abridgment, "Chimin Private," p. 516(c)(4) (2nd ed. 1741).

Is Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taut. 125 (C.P., 1813).
19 Id., at 132.
20 Berridge v. Ward, 2 F. & F. 208, 212 (N.P., 1860).

21 Lewis Street, 2 Wend, 472 (N.Y., 1829), where the court held that a
purchase of a building lot bounded on a street shall have an easement
of right of way in the street.
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access was decided in 1839.22 The plaintiff tried unsuccessfully
to enjoin the defendant from operating railway trains over the
street on which the plaintiff abutted. The court stated:
The title to such [abutting] lots carries with it as essential
ingredients, certain services and easements, not only valuable
and almost indispensable, but as inviolable as the lots themselves.

...[The abutting owners] have a peculiar interest in that street,
which neither the local nor general public can pretend to claim-a
private right of the nature of an incorporeal hereditament, legally

attached to their contiguous ground-an incidental title to certain
faculties and franchises assured to them by contract and by law,
without which their property would be comparatively
23 of but little
value, and would never have been bought by them.
Several other scattered early cases deal with private or public
non-highway interferences with the abutter's "right of access. 24
The first court to develop a ratio decidendi on access rights
was the New York Court of Appeals in the Elevated Railway
cases. 2 i These cases established the right of access in all abutting
owners, no matter how the street was acquired (easement, fee, or
in trust) by the city, as against non-highway 'uses of the street.
The abutter has the right "to have the street left open, so that
from it, access may be had to the lot, . ." .,21 This same court subsequently held that as against a highway use of the street, the
abutter may not assert his right of access. 27 During this period,
the United States Supreme Court held that it was bound by a
state's determination of whether a right of access existed, and if
22

Lexington and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana 289 (Ky., 1839).

23 Id., at 294.
24 Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38 (1855); Murphy v. City of Chicago, 29 Ill.
279 (1862); Jaynes v. Omaha Street Ry. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67
(1898). The latter case held that an abutting property owner is entitled to compensation if the presence of poles and wires in the street
in front of his property causes such property to depreciate in value.
21; Story v. The New York Elevated Railroad Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882);
Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Railroad Co., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528
1887); Kane v. New York Elevated Railroad Co., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E.
278 (1891).
26 Story v. The New York Elevated Railroad Co., 90 N.Y. at 146. Other
important considerations were that light and air would be furnished
to the property owner across the open way.
27 Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904).
An elevated viaduct was constructed by authorization of the state legislature
and was devoted to proper street use. The court held that the structure was not, therefore, a nuisance and any losses to the abutting
owners were damnum absque injuria.
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so, when it was deprived. 28 In passing, the Court also noted that
".. . the right of an owner of land abutting on public highways
has been a fruitful source of litigation ... and the decisions have
been conflicting, and often in the same state irreconcilable in
29
principle."
There are three possible reasons why the judicial concept of
right of access was created:
(1) the historical precedent that
roads were intended to develop abutting lands; (2) the economic
history of road construction; (3)" the response to a need.
A.

THE LOGICAL USE OF THE LOT AND ROAD.

Without free access to any abutting roads, the abutter's lot
would have little use or value.30 It was in reliance on the future
use of such roads that the abutter purchased and developed his
land.3 ' Since the early American law favored the development
of our natural land resources, the courts easily conceived that
the roads were intended to develop the abutting lands.3 2 From
these premises the right of access logically flowed.
B.

THE

EcONoMIC HISTORY OF ROAD BUILDING.

Early road construction was by as well as for local use. Almost all highways were "land-service roads," intended to provide
access to abutting owners. Moreover, the abutters usually donated
the land and materials, and often the labor used in constructing
28

Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82, 19 S.Ct. 106, 43 L.Ed. 379
(1898); Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 27 S.Ct. 686, 51 L.Ed.
1176 (1906).

29

Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. at 548. The state courts have
overruled or modified their own decisions so that, in the end, each

state has, by legislation or judicial decision, established and limited
the rights of abutting owners in accordance with its own view of the
law and public policy.
30 Burlington & M.R.R. Co. v. Reinhackle, 15 Neb. 279, 281, 18 N.W. 69,
70 (1883) where testimony tended to show that the property of the
plaintiff depreciated in value about one-half because of the temporary
blocking of the access street by the cars of the defendant while they
were being loaded and unloaded.
31 Supra, note 21. The court felt that the purchaser had an easement of
right of way in the street and that he was not liable to pay the owner
for the value of the land appropriated by the corporation when the
street was opened, but only for the fee subject to the easement.
32 Clay, Speech on Internal Improvement, 1824, in Hacker, "The Shaping
of the American Tradition" (1947), p. 395 et seq.
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the road. 33 The Supreme Court of South Carolina as late as 1836
upheld an order to open a road across private land using so much
of the timber, earth, or rock from the land as might be necessary
to build and maintain the road without receiving the landowner's
consent or awarding him compensation. 34 Since the road was built
by the abutting owner and was intended for his use, no one could
deny his legal right to protect his access to it. 3 5
C.

THtE RESPONSE TO A FELT NEED.

The early cases primarily, if not entirely, are concerned with
non-street uses of the streets for streetcars, elevated railways, and
railroad tracks. 3 6 Since such uses of the street lowered the value
of the abutting owner's property or made it less desirable and
did not further the purpose for which the street was dedicated,
the landowner deserved some form of protection or compensation.
In order to grant such protection, the court needed a legal concept
upon which to base its actions. Accordingly, it declared 37that the
right of access existed and granted the desired protection.
In the ad hoc development of the right of access, it is more than
likely that these three factors were interwoven to such a degree
as to become indistinguishable. Whatever its origin, the right is
now clearly established as a concomitant of ownership of land
abutting on a highway.
The right of access to and from a public highway is one of
the incidents of ownership and occupancy of land abutting thereon.
Such right is appurtant to the land and exists when the fee title
to the way is in the public as well as when it is in private ownership. It is a property right 38of which the owner cannot be deprived
without just compensation.
Duhaime, "Limiting Access to Highways," 33 Ore.L.Rev. 16, 19 (1953).
See State v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).
34 State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (S.C., 1836). The theory behind this order
was that a tacit reservation of so much material as may be necessary
for the ordinary purposes of making roads and highways is part of
every freehold grant.
35 Note-"Freeways and the Rights of Abutting Owners," 3 Stanford
L. Rev. 298, 300 (1951).
3, Jaynes v. Omaha Street Railway, 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67 (1898)a street car; Metropolitan West Side Elevated Ry. Co. v. Stickney,
150 Ill. 362, 37 N.E. 1098 (1894)-an elevated railway; Adams v. Chicago B. & N. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N.W. 629 (1888)-a railroad.
37 Supra, note .15.
3s 25 Am. Jur., Highways, § 154 (1954). This same section goes on to say
that the right of access is, however, subordinate to the public convenience of which the public authorities having control of the streets
are the judges.
33
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III. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
An abutting owner possesses an equal right with the rest of the
public to the use of the street. In addition to this right he possesses
other rights exclusive to him as an abutting owner. 39 This article,
however, is concerned only with the owner's right of access, and
then only about the interference with this right for public highway purposes.
Many of the early cases, and some of the modern ones, fall
within three categories that are not applicable to the problem of
public interference with, or control of, the right of access for
highway purposes.4 0 These categories are:
(1) obstruction of access by a private individual for his own
purposes, e. g., obstructing the street with a private
41
structure.
(2) obstruction of access by public acts, or failure to act,
which deny the highway the use for which it was con42
structed, e. g., vacation.
(3)

obstruction of access by public use of the highway for a
43
non-highway purpose, e. g., a railway.

These cases are not applicable to this problem because they do
not concern either public regulation or a highway purpose which
tends to increase the capacity or safety of the road.

39 In this second class of rights are included: (1) the right of access,
or ingress and egress, (2) the right of light and air, (3) the right of
view, (4) the right to have the street kept open and continued as a
public street, and (5) whatever adds to the value of the street to the
abutter. See 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., § 30.56
(1950).
40

Duhaime, "Limiting Access to Highways," 33 Ore.L.Rev. 16, 28 (1953).

41

Michelsen v. Dwyer, 158 Neb. 427, 63 N.W.2d 513 (1954); McDonald v.
English, 85 Ill. 232 (1877). In the Michelsen case the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that the use of part of any city street for private garage
purposes would be injurious to and inconsistent with the public use of
the street and hence could not be authorized by the city.
Steck v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation Dist., 132 Neb.

42

822, 273 N.W. 268 (1937); City of Chicago v. Union Bldg. Co., 102 Ill.
43

379 (1882); Johnson v. Oakland, 148 Md. 432, 129 Atl. 648 (1925).
Jaynes v. Omaha Street Ry. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67 (1898); Webb
v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 114 Md. 216, 79 Atl. 193 (1910).
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Within this frame of reference, what is the right of access?
The Supreme Court of Nebraska stated:
The right of an owner of property abutting on a street to ingress and egress to and from his premises by way of such street is
a property right in the nature of an easement in the street which
the owner of the abutting property has, not in common with the
public generally, and -of which he can not be deprived
without
44
due process of law and compensation for his loss.

It inheres only in property abutting on the street.45
The right of access need not be exercised to preserve it, but
any failure to use the access may be reflected in diminishing the
damages for taking the unexercised right.46 While the older cases
speak of access from any point on the land contiguous to the highway,47 the modern well-reasoned cases restrict the right to reasonable access from the land.4s The Supreme Court of Nebraska has
stated:
The measure of the right of the owner of property abutting on
a street to access to and from it by way of the street is reasonable
ingress and egress under all the circumstances. The right of
access does not extend to all points
in the boundry between the
abutting property and the street. 49
The right of access is subject to the fullest exercise of the
public's primary right of travel on the street. 50 Accordingly the
right of access is not impaired by reasonable traffic regulations
Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 573, 83 N.W.2d 76, 84
(1957). See also Burlington & M.R.R. Co. v. Reinhackle, 15 Neb. 279,
18 N.W. 69 (1883).
45 City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal.App.2d 180, 210 P.2d 717 (1949).
40 Department of Public Works v. Filkins, 411
Ill. 304, 104 N.E.2d 214
(1952). The jury viewed the premises and were of the opinion that
ingress and egress would be provided in a better manner after the
construction of the highway. Therefore, an award of just compensation was unnecessary as what was given up was of no value.
47 E.g., Berridge v. Ward, 2 F.&F. 208 (N.P., 1860).
48 Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957);
State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957); New York, C. & St. L., R. Co. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 NE.
562 (1934).
49 Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 574, 83 N.W.2d 76, 85
1957). The City of Scottsbluff was allowed to restrict access to the
street (U.S. Hwy 26) which deprived the plaintiff's business, Terry's
Town and Country, of off-street parking because the widening and
curbing of the street was a reasonable good faith exercise of the
police power.
44

50 Supra, note 27.
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even though they result in making the access more difficult or
less useful. 51 Left turn 2 or one way street regulations0 3 do not
affect the abutter's right of access. They merely regulate the flow
of traffic once access to the streets has been gained. Nor is the
right of access affected by regulation of the type of traffic on the
abutting street such as weight restrictions 4 and boulevard regulations. 55 All of these regulations fall into the category of reasonable traffic regulation to which the right of access is subject.
The right of access is subject to two other serious limitations.
The right of access is not affected by (1) the fact that circuity of
travel will result from the action, and (2) the fact that traffic will
be diverted from passing the abutting property.

A. DIVESION OF TRAFFIc.
An abutting land owner has no legal right to a continuation
of the flow of traffic in front of his property. Claims of damage
have been made that the relocation of a highway has diverted the
main stream of traffic away from the abutter's land, and that such
diversion of traffic has reduced the value of the abutter's premises.
This is not a compensable injury to the right of access.
While the cases have generally concerned an attempt to relocate the highway on other than the abutter's remaining property," the strongest possible situation was presented in a New

51 The classic case on this proposition, Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses,
268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935), held that the plaintiff's access had
not been deprived or injured where, because of no left turn regulations and divided traffic lanes, he was required to proceed an addi,2

tional five miles from his property to his right before he could proceed
to the left.
Ibid.

53 Chissel v. City of Baltimore, 193 Md. 535, 69 A.2d 53 (1949); Cavanaugh
v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S.W. 51 (1926); Commonwealth v. Nolan, 189
Ky. 34, 224 S.W. 506 (1920).
G4 Wilbur v. City of Newton, 310 Mass. 97, 16 N.E.2d 86 (1938); People v.
Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361 (1930). The latter case held that a
limitation of gross weight on one axle of a vehicle does not take
property without due process of law, but is a proper exercise of the
police power.
55 Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 263 Ill.
446, 105 N.E. 336 (1914); Abrey v. Livingstone, 95 Mich. 181, 54 N.W.
714 (1893).
56 E.g., State v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1953).
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Mexico case.57 The relocated highway, U. S. 85, was also on the
abutter's land, but inaccessible to the improvements he had built
to service the traffic on old U. S. 85. He alleged that since some
of his property was being taken, the before and after valuation
test should be applied, and that the after valuation should reflect
the diminuation in value of his property by the diversion of traffic
away from his improvements abutting old U. S. 85. The court held
that such an element of damage is non-compensable. 58
* * * an owner has no right in the continuation or maintenance
of the flow of traffic past his property. The diminuation in the
value of land occasioned by a public improvement that diverts the
main flow of traffic from in front of one's premises is non-compensable.59

B.

CIRCUI

OF TRAVEL.

An abutting owner has no legal right to travel from his
property to his destination in the most direct route possible. We
have already noted the effect of reasonable traffic regulations.
The abutter's right consists of access to the system of public streets;
from then on, his rights are those of an ordinary highway traveller.
Claims of damage have been made that an improvement forces
an abutter to travel a greater distance once on the road system to
reach his destination. This is not damage to the right of access.6 0
The most common occurence of this problem is in the division
into lanes of a highway. A dividing strip is placed in the middle
G7

Santa Fe County v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 158 P.2d 859 (1945).

58 See also City of Chicago v. Spoor, 190 Ill. 340, 60 N.E. 540 (1901); Petition of Johnson, 344 Pa. 158, 23 A.2d 880 (1942); McMinn v. Andersen,
189 Va. 289, 52 S.E.2d 67 (1949). Contra, Pike County v. Whittington,
263 Ala. 47, 81 So.2d 288 (1955). The Pike case held that the abutter
is not entitled to compensation merely by reason of relocation of a

highway. However, if such relocation involves taking of a portion of
the abutter's land, the fact that the abutter's buildings and business
enterprises are thereby made less accessible to the highway is a circumstance to be determined in assessing damages.
59 State v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1953).
00 Hanson v. City of Omaha, 157 Neb. 403, 59 N.W.2d 622 (1953).

The

court held that persons claiming an interest in property not abutting
on the street or alley to be closed were not entitled to recover damages
unless they could show an injury which was different in kind, and
not merely in degree, from that suffered by the public at large. Where
such property owners had to travel a more roundabout way to reach
certain points because of the closing of streets and alleys, the injury
was held to be different from that sustained by the public only in
degree.
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of the roadway and the two streams of traffic are physically separated. An abutting owner may then proceed in only one direction
on leaving his property; he must proceed in that direction to an
area in which a U-turn or left turn is permitted and return to go
the other way. This does not affect the right of access,0 ' even
though it lowers the abutting land's value,62 or requires the abutter
to travel several hundred feet out of his way.63 Where such dividing strip also closes off an intersecting street some courts held this
is encompassed in the non-compensable aspects of the circuity
of travel doctrine; 64 others hold it compensable on a theory of
vacation. 65
The circuity doctrine also applies where an improvement between the abutter's land and destination, but not affecting his
immediate highway access, makes his travel more lengthy. A
limited access road cutting off a direct road to town and requiring
a landowner to travel over a different route that is a mile longer
has been held mere circuity and non-compensable. 6 Once upon
the highway the abutter does not deserve to be treated any differently than any other member of the traveling public; he has
no legal right infringed by mere circuity of travel.
Turner v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md. 428, 132 A.2d 455 (1957);
State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957); Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d 300
(1957); Brady v. Smith, 139 W.Va. 259, 79 S.E.2d 851 (1954); City of
Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).
62 Langley Shopping Centers Inc. v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md.
230, 131 A.2d 690 (1957).
63 People v. Sayig, 101 Cal.App.2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (1951).
64 Holman v. State, 97 Cal.App.2d 237, 217 P.2d 448 (1950).
65 Hamilton v. State Highway Commission, 220 Miss. 340, 70 So.2d
856 (1954). Here, plaintiffs were joint owners of corner lots upon
different sides of the street. Defendant Highway Commission placed
dividing strip in the center of the street upon which both lots abutted
and allowed this strip to blockade the cross-street, thus effectively
separating the properties. The court held that blockading the crossstreet was a vacation of a street, for which compensation had to be
given under statute, and distinguished this situation from that of
causing mere inconvenience of travel where property does abutt
on vacated street.
61
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Department of Highways v. Jackson, -

Ky. -,

302, S.W.2d 373 (1957).

But see Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 121 N.E.2d 56
(1954). The latter case held that ". . . the Legislature [by statute]
plainly established that any impairment or deprivation of access which
an owner formerly had to a public way may so affect the value of the

remainder of the land not taken as to be compensable in damages
....
" 121 N.E.2d at 58.
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The right of access may be redefined as a right of ingress and
egress from abutting premises onto the highway, which is subject
to reasonable traffic regulations and is not affected by any diversion of traffic on the highway or any circuity of travel encountered
once on the roadway.
IV. THE MEANS OF ACCESS CONTROL
Control of access to promote safety, increase efficiency, and
protect the highway investment is important to the Interstate
Highway System at two levels: (1) the control of access on the
41,000 miles of the System itself, and (2) the control of access on
the state primary roads that will act as feeder roads to the System
and carry the eighty percent of American highway traffic not
served by the Interstate System.
State actions to control access will fall under one of two basic
constitutional classifications: eminent domain or police power. 67
In the area of access controls the power to take property for the
public use on payment of just compensation and the power to
regulate the use of property in the public interest without the
payment of compensation are closely interwoven. In determining
under which classification a specific act falls involves weighing
many conflicting interests. 68 Rather than analyzing the legal
results in terms of eminent domain and police power it is preferable to view the whole kit of access control tools available for
both the Interstate System and the state primary system, evaluating the problems that arise thereunder, indicating where there
have been court tests of them, and how the tools have been
classified.
There are three general approaches to the problem of access
controls:
(1) Denial or Limitation of Access, which constitutes
67

In England, while the right of access is recogniz&d, Marshall v.
Borough of Blackpool, 1935 A. C. 16 (House of Lords), no comparable
constitutional limitation to just compensation exists on public takings.

The right of access is subject to severe statutory restrictions without
compensation. See Garner, The Public Control of Land (1956), p. 80.
08 See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).

Such interests include the private right of a property owner in the
nature of an easement in the street which is appurtenant to his abutting property and which is his private right as distinguished from
his right as a member of the public and from the general policy
of distributing throughout the community the loss inflicted upon
the individual by a public improvement. Such a policy adds the
phrase "or damaged" to the word "taken" in the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution.
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control of access directly by restricting or fully denying it to the
abutter; (2) Control of The Amount of Access, which constitutes
control of access indirectly by controlling the number and location of the access points allowed to the abutter; (3) Control of the
Type of Access, which also constitutes control of access indirectly
by controlling the nature of the access allowed the abutter.
A.

DENIAL OR LIMITATION OF

AccEss

Denial or limitation of access is a frontal assault on the access
problem: it seeks a solution by either fully eliminating or seriously
restricting the right of the abutting owners to access. Denial or
limitation of access can take three forms: the .controlled-access
road, the freeway, and the parkway. 69 The first two directly limit
the abutter's right of access; the latter prevents the land owner
from becoming an abutter by swath-land purchases.
1.

The Controlled Access Road

A controlled access road is one planned... "to give preference
to through traffic to a degree that, in addition to access connections
with selected public roads, there may be some crossings at grade
and some private driveway connections. 7 0° This control device
allows certain limited access in areas where it does not constitute
an undue danger and eliminates it completely in danger areas.
In congested areas complete extinguishment of existing rights
of direct access may be necessary. In areas where there is less
extensive traffic, as in agricultural areas, some limited direct
access may be permitted to abutting owners without unduly endangering through traffic3 1
69 According to the American Association of State Highway Officials,
"An expressway is a divided arterial highway for through traffic
with full or partial control of access and generally with grade separations at intersections." The three types of expressways discussed
here generally follow the AASHO definitions. See "Roadside Protection," American Automobile Association (1951), p. 14n.
70 Iowa State Highway Commission, Rules and Regulations Regarding
Controlled Access Highways (Revised to Feb. 25, 1957), Rule II B.
Nebraska has defined a "controlled access facility" by a recent statute
as ".

.

. a highway or street especially designed for through traffic

and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or
other persons have no right or easement or only a controlled right
or easement of access, light, air, or view by reason of the fact that the
property abuts upon such controlled access facility or for any other
reason .

. . ."

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1302(6) (Supp. 1957).

71 Finks v. Department of Public Works, 10 Ill.2d 20, 24, 139 N.E.2d
242, 245 (1956).
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The controlled access road presents a flexibility of approach to
the access problem. It achieves some degree of safety and economy without condemning all existing access rights along a road.
On such a traffic facility access for residential or farm purposes
would be allowed in those areas and under those conditions which
prevent it from being harmful to the flow of traffic.
An effective controlled access program involves three steps:
(1) Freezing all existing access points on the highway and allowing future access points only under specified conditions of use
and construction; (2) Restricting existing access points on the
highway to their current use to prevent their becoming commercial or industrial; (3) Denying existing access in those areas, e. g.,
curves, hills, vision triangles, or under those uses, e. g., commercial,
which constitute a hazard to the highway.
In Nebraska where an abutter's right of access grants him
72
only reasonable ingress and egress under all the circumstances,
existing
all
freezing
in
there should be no legal problem involved
access points and allowing future access points only where they
are reasonable in light of all the circumstances, e. g., location, design and intended use.7 3 Such a step will prevent a new unregulated roadside development along the highway.
All existing access points on the highway should be restricted
to their current use. This is also a police power measure, and
will prevent the conversion of existing residential or agricultural
7 4
This will preaccess points into commercial or industrial ones.
72
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"The extent of that right is . . . we think . . . simply reasonable
ingress and egress under all the circumstances." Hillerege v. City of
Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 575, 83 N.W.2d 76, 85 (1957). "It is generally
for municipal authorities, in the exercise of the police power delegated to the city in reference to its streets, to determine what action
is required for the safety, convenience, and welfare of the people
...the test in such a case is whether or not the action proposed is
a good faith, reasonable exercise of the police power or an arbitrary
and unreasonable interference with the rights of the person or persons
affected thereby." Id., at 576 and 85. See also State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957).
Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244
(1946); Village of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N.E.2d
278 (1946).
Man v. Vockroth, 94 N.J.Eq. 511, 121 Atl. 599 (1923). In this case,
an easement in a deed conveying summer residence property which
restricted the use of an adjoining private road to dwelling house
purposes, for which it was used at the time of conveyancing, was
held to be valid, and prohibited the use of the road by guests, tradesmen, and others, to a boardinghouse established by the purchaser.
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vent further unregulated roadside development in the existing
roadside pattern.
Finally, existing access points in those areas or under those
uses which are unreasonable or dangerous to the highway must
be extinguished. The regulation of existing access, if it merely
resticts the existing access to reasonable access, is a non-compensable police power regulation; 75 but if the regulation completely
denies existing access or destroys its total usefulness, then the access must be either purchased by agreement or condemned. 76
A controlled access highway is created and protected by an
interplay of police power and eminent domain control powers.
This control device involves only moderate cost to the state in
condemnation awards, but in turn it produces only a limited form
of protection. While it leaves many access points on the highway,
it nevertheless effectively regulates the pattern of future roadside development. Such control device is well suited to a moderately travelled primary road.
2.

The Freeway

A freeway is a road planned "to give preference to through
traffic by providing access with selected public roads only, and
by prohibiting crossings at grade or direct private driveway connections." 77 This control device entirely eliminates all access to
the roadway from abutting land. It is a roadway entirely isolated,
often by physical barriers, from the abutting land. This is the
type of road that will make up most of the 41,000 miles of the
Federal Interstate Highway System.
A freeway can be laid on converted existing road or entirely
on new alignment. Each can present a different problem of control devices.
(1) On An Existing Road. A freeway is sometimes built on
the site of an existing road. Since the abutters have a right of
75 Supra, note 72.
76 Jones v. City of Aurora, 97 Neb. 825, 151 N.W. 958 (1915); In re
Condemnation of Land, 178 Kan. 26, 283 P.2d 392 (1955); Boxberger
v. State Highway Commission, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920 (1952).
77 Iowa State Highway Commission, Rules and Regulations Regarding
Controlled Access Highways (Revised to Feb. 25, 1957), Rule II A.
In Nebraska, the term "Freeway" is now defined by statute as ". ..
a divided arterial highway for through traffic with . . . full control
of access ... and generally with grade separations at intersection
.....

"

Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-1302(9), 39-1302(10) (Supp. 1957), (Combined

of necessity).
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access to the existing road that must be extinguished before the
road can be converted to a freeway, the state must purchase or
condemn all their access rights.7 8 The cost of purchasing these
rights often exceeds the cost of new right of way, with the result
that freeways are not often laid on the location of an existing
highway except in urban or highly developed areas.
In those areas where for engineering, development, or other
reasons, a freeway is built on the location of an older highway
three major legal problems arise:
(1) valuation of the access
rights taken on condemnation, (2) the effect of providing service
roads or frontage roads to the abutting owners, and (3) the effect
of creating a dead-end or cul-de-sac on a formerly intersecting
street which is not carried under or over the freeway.7 9 The
valuation of access rights is a complicated problem and beyond
the scope of this article. It is introduced here merely to alert the
reader to the fact that such a problem is involved in converting
an existing highway to a freeway.80
The design of a freeway often includes service roads or frontage roads which provide the abutting owner with a means of
local transportation and, at certain locations, provide a means of
ingress to the express portion of the freeway. Where the abutting
owner's access to the converted freeway is cut off but access to
a frontage road is provided, has his right of access been impaired?
Three possible solutions have been put forth by the courts:
(a) There is no damage for deprivation of access when an
existing highway is converted to a freeway where a service road
is supplied."' This result is based on the reasoning that the abutter's right of access is only to the public road system and not necessarily the express portions thereof and that any circuity of travel
that results once on the roads system is non-compensable.
(b) There is no damage for deprivation of access when an
existing highway is converted into a freeway when a service road
78

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-1329 (Supp. 1957). See also Department of Public
Works v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d 322 (1953).

This last problem, the cul de sac, also arises when a freeway is
built entirely on new location and the roads that lie in its path are
not carried over or under the freeway. The question will not be
treated again under freeways built on new location.
80 See generally Keefe, "Damages to Property Not Taken." 1957 U. Ill.
Law Forum 296.
81 Gilmore v. State, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Ct. Claims, 1955).
79
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is supplied and none of the abutter's land is taken;8 2 but there are
damages for deprivation of access under such circumstances when
some of the abutter's land is taken in the conversion.8 3 This result
is reached on a constitutional basis. In both cases, the courts argue
that the abutting land suffers consequential damages, i. e., the
property decreases in actual value by being placed on a frontage
road. In the former case, however, there has been no "taking"
within the constitutional eminent domain limitations so there can
be no compensation; but in the latter case, since there has been
a taking, the damage will be reflected in the before-and-after
valuations and will be compensated.
(c) There are damages for deprivation of access when an
existing highway is converted into a freeway in all cases even
though a service road is provided, but the service road will act
in mitigation of these damages.8 4 This result is reached by holding
that the abutter has a right of access to the express portion of the
highway, but that some form of access mitigates his damages.
It is submitted that the first solution-no damages for deprivation of access where a service road is supplied-is the preferable
result. The abutter who has access to the service road has access
to the public road system, and any circuity of travel or diversion
of traffic that he experiences is not compensable. Moreover,
under any other rule the Highway Commission would be providing
the abutter with a service road to give him access and would in
turn be required to pay him for impairing his access.
The 1955 Nebraska Legislature answered this question by
choosing the first solution. It provided:
Upon the construction of any frontage road, any right of access
between the controlled access facility, and property abutting or
adjacent to such frontage road shall terminate and ingress and
egress shall be provided to the frontage road at such places as
will afford reasonable and safe connections. 85
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State v. Lynch, - Mo. -, 297 S.W.2d 400 (1956), held that defendants,
who complained only that new construction would deprive them of
direct access, were not necessarily parties to the condemnation action.
State v. Meyers, - Tex. App. -, 292 S.W.2d 933 (1956), which held
that owners of condemned land are entitled to the value of the land
taken, as well as damages to the remaining property, and are entitled
to show loss of profits from their business if they are able
State v. Ward, 41 Wash.2d 794, 252 P.2d 279 (1953); People v. Ricciardi,
23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).

8i-Neb.Rev.Stat.

§ 39-1328 (Supp. 1957).
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The design of the freeway often includes cutting off or "deadending" existing intersecting streets which, for design reasons or
low traffic counts, are not to be carried over or under the freeway. Where an owner of property abutting on that "dead-ended"
street seeks compensation for deprivation of his right of access
by the creation of the cul-de-sac has he a legally cognizable claim?
The courts have provided two divergent answers to this question.
Some courts have held that the right of access extends in both
directions to the next intersecting street, with the result that abutting owners on a cul-de-sac created by a freeway must be compensated for the impairment of their access.8 6 Other courts have held
that the right of access extends only to reasonable access onto the
system of public roads with the result that abutting owners on a
cul-de-sac created by a freeway are not compensated as their
access has not been impaired.8 7 The Nebraska Supreme Court has
held that the vacation of that part of a road leading toward the
abutting owner's principal market area created a special damage
for the abutting owner; 8 the Court has reached the same result
where the "dead-ending" of a street is equivalent to vacation of
the street.8 9 When the abutter's land borders the closed area of
the cul-de-sac, he has been held to be damaged and deserving of
compensation."
But an owner having property abutting on an
86

Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943); Felton
v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615, 171 S.E. 198 (1933); City of
Chicago v. Webb, 102 Ill.App. 232 (1902). See Lindley v. Oklahoma
Turnpike Authority, -

Okla.

-,

262 P.2d 159 (1953).

Weir v. Palm Beach County, - Fla. -, 85 So.2d 865 (1956); Smick
v. Commonwealth, - Ky. -, 268 S.W.2d 424 (1954); New York, C.&St.
L.R.Co. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 N.E. 562 (1934). See in re
5th Street, 146 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1955), where the court indicates that
while a statute controls, at common law no compensation would be
granted.
88 Steck v. Platte Valley P.P. and I. Dist., 132 Neb. 822, 273 N.W.
268 (1937). The owner in the instant case was cut off from the town
of Sutherland when defendants proposed to flood the existing road
with a reservoir between plaintiff's property and town. The court
held that this created a special damage not common to the community
at large, and that this was true even though plaintiff had previously
sold some land to defendants with knowledge that a reservoir was
to be constructed.
89 Lowell v. Buffalo County, 119 Neb. 776, 230 N.W. 842 (1930).
The
plaintiff's land was located on an island, and the road which crossed
the island and river was his only means of access. Vacating part
of the road created a cul de sac.
90 Jones v. City of Aurora, 97 Neb. 825, 151 N.W. 958 (1915). Here the
plaintiff's subdivided land was considered as one tract bordering
the vacated portion of the street.
ST

CONTROL OF ACCESS
open street as well as the street "dead-ended" or closed, or who
is merely using such a street, has not suffered a special or peculiar
damage differing in kind from the general public and has suffered
no compensable injury.9 1 In view of the particular facts in the
cases recognizing this doctrine it is possible that compensation will
be limited to the immediate abutters on the vacated portion of the
street. Such a result is desirable, 92 particularly in view of the
Nebraska holding that an abutter is only entitled to reasonable
access. In any case, the abutter's right extends no further than
the next intersecting street, but not through it. 93 So that a street
which is cut off but connects with a frontage road will not be considered a .cul-de-sac and any alleged damage will be viewed as
94
mere circuity of travel.
The conversion of an existing road to a freeway presents a
cost problem with compensation for access rights that often makes
it less expensive to build on an entirely new location. But in those
situations where other factors make this impossible, these are
the particular problems which will be faced.
(2) On A New Alignment. Generally, freeways in rural areas
are built on entirely new locations. Some states have even restricted the power of building freeways to ones built entirely on
new location.
Nebraska has specifically authorized the consturction of freeways on either new alignment or pre-existing
roads.9 6 The problem of the cul-de-sac reappears here, but the
principles discussed above are controlling. The major question
raised by a freeway laid on new location is whether the abutterto-be on the intended freeway has a right of access to the new
road for which he must be compensated. Or, in short, can a roadway be dedicated as a freeway, or must it be dedicated as a road
and the abutter's right of access then condemned to convert it to
a freeway.
91 Supra, note 62.
92 See Smick v. Commonwealth, - Ky. -, 268 S.W.2d 424 (1954).
93 Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry. Co., 141 Ind. 604, 39 N.E. 223 (1894).
94 Beckham v State, 64 Cal.App.2d 487, 149 P.2d 296 (1944).
Here,
the construction of an improvement on the street intersecting the
street on which plaintiff's property fronted was not compensable as
the plaintiff could not show infringement of his right of reasonable
use of the street fronting his property in either direction to the next
intersection.
95 "Expressway Law," Highway Research Board Special Report 26 (1957)
p. 38 ff.

96 Neb. Rev. Stat § 39-1327 (Supp. 1957).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEWThis problem presented difficulties to the courts when first
raised. Conditioned to think of all roads as land-service roads,
the courts, when first concerned with entirely traffic-service roads,
indicated that such access rights arose in the abutter and must be
condemned 7 However, starting in 1949 a line of California decisions held that where no highway previously existed the construction of a freeway gave the abutting property no right of
accessY8 Since that time Kentucky, Oregon, Missouri, Wisconsin,
Connecticut and Washington 0 have reached the same result.
... the abutter receives or reserves no grant of unlimited
access, and the cases have held he is entitled neither to damages
nor an injunction, when access is restricted by the conditions of
100
the original dedication of the highway.

It would seem clear that where a highway is dedicated as a
freeway that no right of access arises in the abutting owner. The
principle of restricted dedication has long been known at the
common law; 10 1 this is merely its modern application. Moreover,
any other rule would result in the highway commission having to
condemn a right it had just created in order to put the intended
highway into use. Such a result is both costly and ridiculous.
The 1955 Nebraska Legislature also answered this question.
It provided that:
If the construction or reconstruction of any highway, to be
paid for in whole or in part with federal or state highway funds,
07 Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1945); State v. Ward,

41 Wash.2d 794, 252 P.2d 279 (1953). In the Burnquist case, seven
years of unobstructed access-use had occurred from the dedication
to the attempted restriction; in the Ward case, the court held that
the limited access nature of the facility must be specially presented
to the jury, thus implying that a right of access had acckued to the

remaining land
0S City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal.App.2d 348, 210 P.2d 717
(1949); People v. Thomas, 108 Cal.App.2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952);
Schnider v. State, 38 Cal.2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952).
Ky. -, 268 S.W.2d 424 (1954); State v.

99 Smick v. Commonwealth, -

Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954); Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis.
593, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955): State v. Clevenger, 365 Mo. 970, 291 S.W.2d
57 (1956); South Meadows Realty Corp. v. State, 144 Conn. 289, 130
A.2d 290 (1957); State v. Calkins, 50 Wash.2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957).
100 Hutton, "Restricted Dedication of Rights of Way for New Expressways of Other Limited Access Facilities," Highway Research Board
Bulletin 30 (1951) p. 38, 58.
101 Home Laundry Co. v. City of Louisville, 168 Ky. 499, 182 S.W. 645
(1916), where the court stated that the dedicators of a public way
may impose any condition as to its use which they may desire, even
to limiting a street to the use of pedestrians.
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results in the abutment of property on such highway that did not
theretofore have direct egress and ingress to it, no direct rights of
access shall accrue because of such abutment ....102

3.

The Parkway.

A parkway is a road bordered by a broad expanse of land in
public ownership on both sides of the highway that would make
commercial explortation impractical because the business establishment on the nearest private land would be either unseen, or
too remote, or both, from the highway. Whether there is access
to the road through the public land bordering on the road depends
on the statute creating the road. 10 3 Such a control device is feasible
only for scenic routes and is considerably more expensive than
normal right of way purchases. When built on new location, if
the dedication is restricted, the principles discussed above should
apply.
B.

CONTROL OF TBE AMOUNT OF AcCESS.

A- second means of restricting or controlling access to a highway includes the devices which seek to control the number and
location of the access points onto the road. Where the access is
concentrated into pre-determined areas special traffic-receiving
facilities may be engineered to receive the increased traffic. The
first device, subdivision controls, attempts to do this through the
state's control over subdividers. The second device, official mapping, is based on the government's power of mapping future
streets.
1. Subdivision Controls
Subdivision control generally requires that one who divides
his land for sale file for record an accurately surveyed map or
plat. This plat must be approved by one or more official bodies,
102

103

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1329 (Supp. 1957).
Gleason v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 270 Mass. 377, 170 N.E. 395
(1930) where it was held that a denial of all access to an abutter
should not be inferred without statutory language clearly conferring
the power to declare such a denial. See also: Anzalone v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 257 Mass. 32, 153 N.E. 325 (1926); City of Atlanta

v. West, 60 Ga. App. 269, 3 S.E.2d 755 (1939); Abrey v. Livingstone,
95 Mich. 181, 54 N.W. 714 (1893). Note that Nebraska now defines
a parkway within the statutes as ".

.

. an arterial highway for non-

commercial traffic, with full or partial control of access, and usually
located within a park or a ribbon of park-like development." Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 39-1302(16) (Supp. 1957).
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varying with the individual state. When a tract of land is subdivided, the subdivider comes under official regulation in such
matters as lot size, sewerage facilities, and provision for streets;
and such regulations are a legitimate exercise of the police
power. 10 4 Subdividing land abutting on a highway intensifies the
land use and generates more traffic. Under these circumstances,
a subdivider should also be required to provide a satisfactory relationship between the subdivision layout and the abutting highway.
For any subdivision control to be effective as a form of highway protection, all subdividers must be required to file approved
subdivision plats, and all plats abutting on a state trunk highway,
or any other classification found desirable, must be approved by
the State Highway Commission. Among the items that might be
required for plat approval are reduction of entry points onto the
highway, dedication of buffer strips between the highway and the
projected development, and provision of service roads. 10 5 The
existing case law has approved the following subdivision control:
a requirement that the subdivider dedicate a ten foot strip of land
one-quarter of a mile long as a buffer strip on two roads that
abutted the land; 1 6 a requirement that the subdivider dedicate
a ten foot strip 2,400 feet long for widening and another ten foot
strip as a buffer and access barrier; 10 7 and a requirement that the
subdivider dedicate a sixty foot strip as half of a projected road
rather than a thirty-three foot strip.' 0 8
Only two states have required approval on the state level by
the highway commission of plats of land abutting state trunk
Halsell v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 144, 202 S.W. 317 (1918); Town of Windsor
v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354 (1920); Mansfield & Swett,
Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Atl. 225 (1938).
lu "Roadside Protection," American Automobile Association (1951) p. 65.
106 Newton v. American Securities Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311
(1941). Here, the subdivider refused to dedicate the two strips and
104

brought a mandamus proceeding to compel the circuit clerk to record

107
108

the plat which was disapproved by the city and county planning boards.
The trial court granted the petition because no provisions were made
for compensation of the subdivider for the loss of the use of the
strips. But the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded
on the basis that they felt unable to set aside the judgment of the
planning boards without evidence that the boards had acted arbitrarily.
Ayres v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58
(1928).
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highways: Wisconsin'"° and Michigan. 1 0 Under the Michigan
statute the highway commission may require adequate widths and
adequate provision for traffic safety in laying out drives which
enter or leave a state trunk or federal-aid highway."' Under the
Wisconsin statute the highway commission must approve all plats
which border on a state trunk highway or connecting street. Approval requires a layout providing either a minimum number of
access points onto the highway or the provision by the subdivider
112
of service roads.
This subdivision control device provides a means of securing
adequate highway width and some means of access control on all
subdivided lands. Nebraska has no enabling statute comparable
to the Wisconsin or Michigan subdivision controls acts.
2.

Official Mapping

Official mapping is a comparatively simple device; it is a
legally effective layout of the future location of streets and roads."13
Urban areas have long mapped their streets, allowing land owners
to make the necessary adjustments to them long in advance and
reducing the cost of construction by denying compensation fof any
improvements made in the bed of the mapped street after the
4
official map is placed on public record.1
The purpose of official mapping is two-fold: to establish the
ultimate right of way lines on a highway and to plan future intersecting street locations. The establishment of ultimate right of
way lines will prevent the growth of improvements in the highway bed and prevent the highway-strangulation that results from
too close economic development.I1
The benefits here will run
to both the state and the landowner. The state will benefit from
109 Wisc. Stat. §§ 236.01 et seq. (1957).

Especially § 236.02(7).

110 Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 26.463 et seq. (1957). Especially § 26.466.
111 Beuscher, "Protection of Highways and Feeder Streets Through Subdivision Controls," Highway Research Board Bulletin 101 (1955),
pp. 52, 57.
112 Wisc. Stats. § 236.13(1)(e); Wisc. Admin. Code, Hy-33.01 et seq.
113 Kucirek and Beuscher, "Wisconsin's Official Map Law." 1957 Wis.L.Rev.
176.
114 Scattergood v. Lower Merion Tp. Comm'rs., 311 Pa. 490, 167 Atl. 40
(1933).

115 "Roadside Protection," American Automobile Association (1951) p. 7
et seq; Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis.2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1958).
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the lower right of way acquisition costs and prevention of highway
strangulation; the landowner will benefit from security for his
improvements.
The planning of future intersecting street locations will present a means of indirect access control. When a highway is
mapped, those areas at which access will be allowed will be indicated. The abutting owner may then plan his development to
make use of the access areas which, in turn, will be specifically
designed to handle this increased traffic. Official mapping wi
reduce the cost of right of way acquisition and allow access to
the road at specially designed and designated areas with a minimum of hardship on the abutting owners.
In Nebraska statutory authorization for official mapping was
granted in 1955 to first class cities or cities having a greater population than required for a first class city."" The act provides that
these cities ". . . shall develop and adopt a master street plan cooperatively between the department [of Roads] and the municipal
officials, which shall insure the proper location and integration of
the highway connections in the total city street plan . . ." One of
the objectives of the mapping act is ". . . to insure a system of
streets upon which traffic can be controlled and protected, in such
a manner as to provide safe and efficient movement of traffic within a municipality. . . ." The act further provides sanctions by
means of withholding further highway appropriations from the
city if such a master street plan is not completed within a designated time. This act, while limited to a narrow class of cities and
not covering the whole road system, should provide an effective
means of roadside protection within its sphere if the Department
of Roads requires a well-planned official map from the cities.
C.

CONTROL OF THE TYPE OF AcCESS

A third means of restricting or controlling access to a highway
consists of the devices which control the type of access to the
road. Certain types of access are more frequent and more dangerous than others. Residential access presents nowhere near the
control problem that commercial access does. The devices available to control the type of access to a highway are restricted use
highways, roadside zoning, and master planning. The first device,
the restricted use highway, controls the type of access by entirely
excluding certain kinds of traffic from the highway or from the
use of access to it; the latter two devices, roadside zoning and
110

Neb. Rev. Stat., § 39-1312 (Supp. 1957).
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master planning, control the type of access in an area by controlling the land use and restricting commercial and industrial
development to specified portions of the highway.
1. Restricted Use Highways
The use made of a highway can be controlled by two meansrestricting the use of the road itself or restricting the use of the
access by which ingress and egress are had to the highway.
The most common form of restricted use highway is the boulevard or parkway. These have long been held valid as an exercise
of the police power. 117 On such restricted use highways only a
designated class of traffic, e. g., automobiles, may use the street
for more than one block. As a practical matter this device is of
little value except in urban areas since it requires the building of
another traffic facility to service the traffic not permitted on the
restricted use highway and the undesirable access uses are not
prohibited but merely made somewhat more difficult.
A much more practical approach to the restricted use concept
is the restriction of the use of access. An easement of access which
is restricted to a residential use cannot be used for commercial
use.118 Thus by regulating the use that can be made of access, a
great degree of highway protection may be achieved.
Since the number of vehicular movements at an approach to
a highway bears a direct relationship to the kind or purpose of
use that is made of the approach, controlling the kind or purpose
of use effectively controls the frequency of use.119
The use of the right of access may be controlled through eminent domain, either on an existing highway or in the condemnation
provision for acquiring land for a new highway. 120 In Nebraska,
the Department of Roads is expressly empowered to reasonably
"... provide and define ... the location, width, nature, and extent
117 E. g., Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park,
263 Ill. 446, 105 N.E. 336 (1914); Barnes v. Essex County Park Commission, 86 N.J.L. 141, 91 Atl. 1019 (1914).
11S Man v. Vockroth, 94 N.J.Eq. 511, 121 Atl. 599 (1923). See CornellAndrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & P. R. Corp., 215 Mass. 381, 102
N.E. 625 (1913).
119 Enfield and Mclean, "Controlling the Use of Access," Highway Research Board Bulletin 101 (1955), p. 70.
120 State v. Superior Court, 47 Wash.2d 335, 287 P.2d 494 (1955).
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of any right of access . . ." in the purchase agreement or condemnation proceedings when land is acquired for the purpose of widening, improving, or building a highway.12 1 It is also possible that
such use control could be achieved under a police power measure.
It clearly could be controlled by zoning. 12 2 It is also possible that
mere use of access, rather than land use, could be similarly restricted. Such use restriction would be less severe than zoning,
since, when access is restricted to residential purposes, there is
nothing to prevent the use of the land for other purposes if other
access is available. If such access use restriction were to be instituted "... . to the extent that a court holds to the proposition that
access rights are subordinate to the rights of the traveling public,
and existing use of access can be restricted whenever it impinges
on these rights-and this without regard to whether or not the use
constitutes a nuisance."'123 By legislation passed in 1955, the Nebraska Department of Roads is empowered to restrict the use of
access through a permit system. 2 4 This is a readily administered
form of access use control, so long as the control is reasonable. 1 25
The restricted use highway presents an access control device
of some use in urban areas. The restricted use of access, however,
presents an access control device that has a great effect on highway safety and in the construction of new highways makes available a means of modified access control.
2.

Roadside Zoning

Municipal zoning in the United States can be traced back as
far as 1892 when building height regulations were adopted in Boston and 1910 when such restrictions were applied in Washington,
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Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1330 (Supp. 1957).
City and County of San Francisco v. Safeway Stores, 150 Cal.App.2d
327, 310 P.2d 68 (1957).

Erbe, "Highway Laws Relating to Controlled Access Roads," 36 Title
News 6, 11 (1957).
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Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-1332 to 39-1336 (Supp. 1957).
Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244

(1946), where tlhe refusal of the city council to grant a permit to cut
the curb and construct a driveway to serve a private business, after
the council had received testimony that such driveway would create
a traffic hazard was held to be a legitimate and proper exercise of
police power in that the regulation had a

public safety."

"...

substantial relation to
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D.C.1 26 Rural zoning was introduced in the 1920's,127 but the development of highway zoning has been even more recent.
Zoning powers include the regulation of the use of land and
buildings, the height of buildings, and the size of yards and open
space. Zoning may be used to control the location of buildings adjacent to the highway right of way.
The objectives of roadside zoning are to:
(1) Confine roadside commercial uses to designated commercial districts. The remainder of the highway frontage is
limited to uses which are characteristic of the general area
through which the highway passes (e. g., residential use, agriculture, forestry, etc.).
(2) Require that roadside buildings be set back from
outer boundaries of the highway right-of-way.
(3)
Control the appearance of certain aspects of roadside
commercial development relating to safety, health, and general
12
welfare. S
Where a highway passes through an urban area it normally
falls under the metropolitan comprehensive zoning pattern. Certain areas abutting upon the highway will be zoned for industrial
or commercial use; other areas will be divided into various classes
of residential uses. When the highway passes through rural areas
it is subject to no zoning protection. A program of highway zoning
would provide strip zoning along the highway in the rural areas
and provide recognition of the peculiar character of property abutting upon a main thoroughfare in the urban areas. Modern zoning
enabling acts are inadequate for this task since even extra-territorial zoning powers can not cover the whole highway system 2
nor are they oriented to highway protection problems. Highway
zoning would have the following major results:
(a) Location of Land Uses. By restricting roadside commercial and industrial uses to specific zoned areas, such land uses could
only occur within those areas. These heavy access use areas could
be designed to handle safely increased ingress and egress from the
road through acceleration lanes, service roads, and designed angles
126
127

Zoning and Civic Development, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States (n. d.), p. 8.
Wehrwein, "County Zoning and Consolidation," 11 Wis. L. Rev. 136
(1936).

128 "Roadside Protection," American Automobile Association (1951), p. 52.
129 Bouwsma, "The Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning," 8
Vanderbilt Law Rev. 806 (1955).
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of entrance. The less frequent farm and non-farm access in the
rural areas presents no substantial problem; the urban residential
access could be controlled through such allied control devices as
subdivision controls.
(b) Setback Requirements. Many of our highway problems
stem from the crowding of highways by the abutting developments. The choking of the highway by close-in development also
prevents the modernization of existing highways by making it too
expensive. The ultimate result of this close-in development is
the relocation of the highway resulting in great loss to the state
and the abutting owners who had invested in reliance on the continuation of the highway on its prior location.
Zoning could require setbacks in rural areas where none now
exist and in urban areas based on functional differentiation of
the abutting streets, i. e., ". . . not width but intimacy between the
traffic way and the abutting land use."' 30 The setback requirement should be based on the nature of the abutting street or highway and should be expressed in feet from the center line or outer
edge of the roadway. The setback requirement should not be confined solely to the zoned commercial or industrial districts, but
31
should apply to all buildings adjacent to the highway.1
The basic principles of zoning law are well established; their
application to the roadside area, while novel, would be entirely
within the logical extension of these principles. 32 It has, however,
been suggested that zoning is a less desirable legal basis than control of access use. 3 3 Highway strip zoning would clearly require
explicit statutory authorization.
The 1957 Nebraska Legislature repealed the statutes creating
the State Zoning Agency and granted all counties the power to
zone all areas of the county not within an incorporated village or
a city's territorial or extra-territorial zoning district. 3 4 The same
Legislature also expressly empowered counties in which military
establishments are located to issue zoning regulations. "Such
regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
130
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132 Levin, "Highway Zoning and Roadside Protection in Wisconsin," 1951
Wis L. Rev. 197, 216 et seq.
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plan.., and designed to lessen the congestion in the streets, roads,
and highways.. .. "135 An intelligent administration of these various
county zoning powers could provide the roadside protection sought,
but experience in Wisconsin, where county zoning has a long history, indicates that county zoning action alone is too slow in coming and too ineffective when applied. 136 The operation of the former Nebraska Zoning Agency' 3 7 might provide the basic experience necessary for some form of cooperative state-county zoning.
While arguments can be made for either state or county zoning
in the area of highway protection, a form of state-county cooperative zoning would prove the best. Without local participation in
the decision making process, highway zoning would tend to be an
outside influence imposed without due regard for local interests
and plans. Without some state control, zoning would tend to be
uneven, unduly slow, and unreliable. A cooperative state-county
zoning program would entail these basic features:
1) The State Highway Commission [in Nebraska, the Department of Roads] would be empowered to request any county
to zone the land abutting upon a highway.
2) If the county does not act within a specified period, the
Highway Commission could then zone a 500 foot strip on either
side of the center line of the highway.
3) If the county does act, and the Highway Commission is
satisfied with its zoning, an annual zoning aid would be paid to
the county to help administer the zoning controls. 138
Where uses have become established zoning is little more than
a palliative, but for future development it is a very potent control
device. Roadside zoning has the advantage of being a police power
measure. 39 Coupled with other control devices it presents a read135 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-163 (Supp. 1957).

136 For example, by October 1957 only four Wisconsin counties had adopted
highway set-back requirements under their zoning powers. However,
an unascertained number of counties have adopted some form of setback requirement as a part of their over-all zoning ordinances.
137 Formerly authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-830 to 81-838 (Reissue
1950), as amended. These sections, however, were repealed by the
1957 Legislature; Neb. Laws c. 381, p. 1324 (1957).

Beuscher, "Protection of Highways and Feeder Streets Through Subdivision Controls," Highway Research Board Bulletin 101 (1955), pp.
52, 59.
139 Levin, "Public Control of Highway Access and Roadside Development"
(1947), p. 68 et seq.
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ily available, inexpensively administered form of roadside pro140
tection.
3. Master Planning
In the previous discussion we have distinguished several means
of access control and roadside protection: the freeway, the conrolled access road, roadside zoning, official mapping, and subdivision controls, among others. This last tool, master planning,
brings all these devices together in a unified pattern. Master
planning, of course, is broader than highways. It encompasses
the whole pattern of societal living. It is concerned not only
with the traffic circulatory system, but also with land use districts
and the location of parks, public facilities, and utilities. Our concern, however, is with the master plan and highways.
Master planning can predetermine the location of streets, their
widths and points of intersection. It can regulate the use of land
and of access as well as determine the nature and composition
of traffic generators. Finally it can determine the nature of the
access, if any, to be allowed on any street or road.
In general it will establish the pattern for those elements of
community development that can be classified as land use, both
public and private.
A coordinated outline of the future land use areas of the community is thus the basic and most important single function of the
Comprehensive Plan.141
Master planning is a relatively new device in American land
use control. Many of the major urban areas are authorized to
make such plans or have already engaged in making them. 14 2 The
authority to plan and the acts of planning land use have been
143
sustained under court attack as exercises of the police powers.
Master planning is a device for over-all development control
for a city or county. Its effect on highway protection is direct;
it can predetermine locations, widths, and access points. Since
140
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For a review of the existing legislation see, Solberg, "Roadside Zoning,"
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See generally Segoe, "Local Planning Administration" (1948), p. 90
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it predetermines the nature and location of traffic generators and
land uses it is a potent tool in over-all highway protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

The construction of the Interstate Highway System will present two levels at which access controls will be needed. On the
first level, on the system itself, access control will be achieved
mainly through the controlled access road and the freeway. Much
of this mileage will be laid on new location with a restricted
dedication. Access control on this level will be a requirement for
federal participation in costs.
The next level of access control that will be necessary to the
efficient functioning of the Interstate Highway System will be
on the state primary roads that will serve the dual function of
acting as feeder roads for the Interstate System and carrying
eighty percent of national highway traffic that will not be served
by the System. On these roads access controls will not be required by the federal government, but they are nonetheless essential to the safety, efficiency, and economy of those roads and
in turn to the Interstate system which they serve and complement.
It is on these roads that the amount and type of access should
be controlled. Creating a limited access road on state trunk highways would be effective, but, in other than highly developed areas,
it would be too expensive to justify. A notable exception is the
relocation of an existing road or construction of a new one where
144
access limitation can be achieved under a police power measure.
Therefore, control of access on these roads must depend primarily
on the police power controls, i. e., subdivision controls, mapping,
restriction of access use, roadside zoning, and master planning.
Nebraska has existing statutory authorization for county zoning, 14 5
official mapping in first class cities, 146 and state level control of
access use.1 4 7 The other control devices await legislative action.
The particular control device used must be chosen to fit the
section of the road to which it is being applied. What is an ap144
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propriate access control device in a rural area, e. g., access use

control, may not be appropriate in downtown Lincoln, where a
freeway may be required. All of these access controls, however
classified, are extensions of the government's powers to preserve
the road system for the good of the citizens and to protect the

state's economic investment. 'The control devices should not be
viewed as separate powers. They are all expressions of the same
power seeking the same end, but are subject to different constitutional limitations based on their effect upon the abutting land-

owner.
The problem of highway protection has another facet: intergovernmental relations. For example, in Nebraska the zoning
powers rest in the counties and urban areas. When the state
designates a road as an Interstate System feeder, what guarantee
is there that the county will provide or maintain adequate setback
requirements or appropriate land use districts along that road?
To determine the amount of roadside protection actually available, as opposed to the black-letter law, we must ask: how have
the various governmental units integrated their protection powers
and activities? Has the availability of local highway protection
been considered in determining the location of state trunk roads
or Interstate System interchange? Does adequate cooperation
exist between highway planning on the state level and comprehensive planning on the local level, e. g., as between the Department of Roads and the City of Omaha?
Freeways, controlled access, and control of access use are
powers vested at the state level. Official mapping powers, while
exercised cooperatively, are vested at the county or city level.
Only with intelligent and effective intergovernmental relations
and with a free flow of information and cooperation in both directions can these diverse political units administer an effective and
unified program of highway protection. Certainly control of access under a master plan is important enough to demand such cooperation.

